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Energy Interdependence
Zha Daojiong
A Critical Juncture
The rapid pace of  growth in China’s total energy consumption over the 
past decade and the seemingly unrestrained rise of  oil prices have generated 
a critical mass of  discussion about China’s energy security. The principle 
concern over energy security in China is the perception that the Chinese 
economy is highly dependent on a stable supply of  energy and cannot tolerate 
the slightest interruption or shortfall. In light of  this, it is crucial to note that 
since China became a net importer of  oil in the early 1990s, there has not 
been a single case of  deliberate disruption of  its foreign supply. 
What about the future prospects of  disruption? There will be numerous 
pitfalls along the way, but managing the growing levels of  interdependence 
between China and the rest of  the world provides the best assurance against 
acts of  hostility by either foreign suppliers or third parties. Achieving this de-
pends both on China’s own energy policies, as well as the role of  international 
actors in China’s search for energy security.
Energy security is not simply the combination of  energy and security. This 
distinction is particularly relevant when international factors come into play. 
Zha Daojiong is an associate professor of  international relations and chair 
of  the Department of  International Political Economy at Renmin University of  
China. He is an expert on Chinese energy policies, politics and diplomacy, as well 
as non-traditional security issues. Zha is the co-author of  Building a Neighborly 
Community: Post Cold War China, Japan, and Southeast Asia and The 
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China Security, Summer 2006, pp.2 - 16
©2006 by the World Security Institute
3China Security    Summer 2006
Energy security contains three essential goals: the availability of  energy needed 
for stable economic and social development, freedom from interruption of  
the energy supply, and the affordability of  energy prices. As such, thinking 
about possible instruments for achieving energy security does not have to 
begin by assessing a nation’s military options. Considerations of  energy and 
security, on the other hand, have more to do with geopolitical factors and the 
national policies of  countries affecting the control of  energy development 
and transportation around the world.  Distinguishing between these two ideas 
is more than an academic exercise. Energy security, as defined above, goes 
more to the heart of  realizing a nation’s well-being, but it must also take into 
consideration issues involving energy and security.
Availability
The availability of  energy resources is first and foremost conditioned by 
geological endowment. The second determinant is the scientific and technical 
means for exploration and production (E&P). A case in point is the oil fields 
of  Daqing (in northeast China). Prior to their discovery in 1959, there was 
an international consensus that no oil, or at least no commercially significant 
amount of  it, was expected to be found in China.1  In stark contrast, after the 
first world oil crisis of  1973, there emerged wild expectations about China 
becoming a viable alternative to the Middle East as a primary oil supplier for 
its Asian neighbors. Since the mid-1980s, however, the pendulum has swung 
once again to a more pessimistic, albeit realistic, estimation of  China’s oil 
potential. There is presently a new international consensus: domestic oil pro-
duction in China is set to stagnate or decline, making it increasingly imperative 
that China seek supplies abroad to meet its energy needs.
This does not necessarily mean a narrowing of  opportunities for inter-
national cooperation for China to increase its domestic oil supply. On the 
contrary, improving homeland supply provides a reason to acquire advanced 
science and technology to enhance China’s oil recovery rate (the amount of  oil 
acquired from the ground against estimates of  available reserve). In the past 
few years, China’s oil recovery rate has declined to approximately 27 percent, 
with a production level of  182 million tons of  crude oil in 2005, or roughly 
56 percent of  the country’s total oil consumption.2  Investment in science 
and technology – including through international collaboration – can improve 
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the amount of  available supply. Indeed, any increase in China’s domestic oil 
supply will help reduce the pressure in the global oil market.
Commitments to E&P projects by oil companies, both Chinese and 
international, are extremely time-sensitive because there is pressure from 
impatient shareholders, who are constantly seeking to divert capital to the 
most profitable outlets. This law of  business demands that the government 
provide robust financial and legal incentives for E&P projects that are viewed 
as risky by oil corporations. Chinese oil companies often complain about in-
sufficient government support for high-risk E&P initiatives in China. If  such 
complaints are well founded, then international concern over China’s growing 
appetite for offshore energy should motivate government-business dialogue 
in order to improve China’s domestic oil recovery rates in developed oil fields 
and the search for new ones.
Likewise, China needs to seek ways, including through international coop-
eration, to augment its oil refining capacity. Technological bottlenecks in re-
fining place a limit on the amount of  heavy 
oil China can process (currently heavy oil 
makes up about one-third of  total crude 
imports).3  Deficits in oil refining technol-
ogy also mean that Chinese oil refiners 
cannot produce oil products with the same 
profit as their international peers, obligat-
ing China to import substantial amounts of  
high-quality oil products. In this regard, the 
benefits for multi-national investors and 
companies in China’s oil refining sector 
are similar to other foreign direct investment projects therein: comparatively 
lower labor costs which can lower production costs. It goes without saying 
that such investments are conducive to ameliorating the competitive impact 
China is having on the global oil markets.
The Basic Necessity of  Coal
Coal is and will continue to be the primary source of  energy in China 
as domestic resources are abundant.4  Energy specialists generally agree that 
there is a sufficient endowment of  domestic coal to sustain China’s present 
consumption for decades to come. Conversely, the pressure to address the 
The policy of  using coal as 
the primary source of  energy 
supply was developed in large 
part as a response to the 
mounting international outcry 
about a “China threat” to 
global energy supply.
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environmental and social consequences of  China’s coal mining industry is 
gathering. One of  the most pressing challenges is to reduce the number of  
coal-mining accidents.5  Fatalities from coal-mining disasters accounted for an 
astounding 39 percent of  all deaths related to workplace accidents.6  Beginning 
in 2003, the government mustered the political will to allow media exposure 
of  such accidents, in part due to the lessons it learned from the mishandling 
of  the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis.7  But media coverage 
in and of  itself  is not sufficient to address the general malaise of  the industry 
and the dangers it holds for social stability. 
It is unfortunate that the central government has made mei wei ji chu 
(coal as the basic source of  energy supply) the main pillar of  its energy 
strategy.8  It should be stressed, however, that this policy was developed in 
large part as a response to the mounting international outcry about a “China 
threat” to global energy supply.9  This 
national plan is leading to unintended 
consequences. It is often abused by all 
levels of  government simply because 
approving a new coal mining project 
does not entail much of  a new demand 
for investment in technology – cheap 
labor and migrating rural labor is still 
abundantly available in China. This 
abuse also has long-term consequences 
since officials can opt out of  supporting 
financially risky projects for developing 
alternative sources of  supply, such as 
renewable energy. Indeed, it is safe to 
say, that mei wei ji chu counteracts much 
of  the positive impact of  China’s law 
designed to promote the development 
of  renewable and alternative energies. 
It also contradicts the notion of  “green 
GDP”, an indicator designed with the 
purpose of  assessing the performance 
of  local government officials in pro-
moting cleaner energies and reducing 
pollution.
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Calculating the Risks
At the same time, the government must also be highly sensitive to the 
requisites for maintaining stable economic and social development, including 
the timely and dependable provision of  energy. Like in all other countries, 
Chinese society has a limited tolerance for shortfalls in energy supply. The 
challenge, then, for China’s energy security policy is to factor in risk-taking by 
the energy industry within the domestic arena. In this regard, dialogue with 
international actors over energy should include the sharing of  technological 
expertise and management of  know-how for Chinese energy corporations to 
lower such risks in China. This is most definitely not an issue of  intellectual 
property rights and cannot be delayed.
In 2005, the Chinese government belatedly announced a policy goal to 
achieve a 20 percent reduction in energy consumption per unit (GDP) pro-
duction by the year 2010 (compared with 2000 levels).10 Such a move indicates 
a realization by the central leadership that it must begin putting a brake on the 
current path of  high-speed growth at any cost. However, conservation can be 
financially costly (and politically costly for sub-national officials if  they fail to 
achieve high growth). Therefore, political resolve – made enforceable through 
financial, administrative, and legal means – is a key prerequisite. The target 
may well be missed but it will be far more damaging if  the policy momentum 
towards more efficient energy consumption either fails to emerge or cannot 
be sustained. 
As is true of  most countries, streamlining the domestic energy industry 
with the aim of  boosting domestic supply cannot be a replacement strategy 
for acquiring energy supply from international markets. The fact that 43 per-
cent of  China’s total oil consumption in 2005 came from imported sources is 
often cited in the media as proof  of  the risks China is facing in securing its 
energy supply.11  Yet, this sense of  insecurity has to be put in context. 
China is not the only country that is dependent on offshore sources for en-
ergy supply. Energy suppliers (both states and companies) are also dependent 
on China for sustained demand. The economic law of  supply and demand is 
such that energy suppliers outside China cannot afford to lose China as a cus-
tomer. Indeed, the phenomenon of  China being the “factory for the world” 
speaks volumes about the associated high costs to international investors and 
consumers (and the foreign economies they are rooted in) should the Chinese 
economy suffer from a deliberate disruption of  energy supply.
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Naturally, there are political and geostrategic factors regarding the global 
energy markets that lurk around the corner and cannot be ignored. However, 
for the time being, the powerful business logic that can and should govern the 
global energy trade should be emphasized. In a strategic business sense, a key 
instrument for encouraging the global 
flow of  energy to China would be to al-
low the domestic price levels to rise above 
international and regional averages. This 
would provide energy developers and 
traders the single most powerful incen-
tive not to disrupt supply to China. It would also motivate them to mitigate 
political interference in business interactions between China and the rest of  
the world in the realm of  energy.
In short, the availability of  supply is central to the conundrum of  achieving 
energy security for China. The solutions to this are multiple. It is particularly 
vital for China to improve its domestic energy industry, both in terms of  
rationalizing production and in demand management. When viewing China’s 
importation of  energy from foreign sources, more attention must be paid to 
the mutual dependence between China as consumer and the world’s energy 
suppliers/producers. 
Supply Interruptions
Interruption of  available energy supply can occur due to a variety of  
technological, natural, and political causes. Within the domestic context, the 
Chinese people are quite familiar with supply interruption resulting from 
technical failures or the policy and technological inadequacies in dealing with 
natural calamities. Such stoppage is usually limited in geographical scope and 
in duration, and therefore is often treated as a matter of  technological safety. 
Disruption of  supply is an energy security issue when the movement of  
foreign energy resources into China becomes problematic. Yet, as stated at 
the outset of  this paper, there has not been a single known major incident 
of  deliberate interruption since the early 1990s, making such issues primarily 
psychological in nature. Although there is no physical evidence to support 
these fears, they have a deep impact on thinking about China’s future fate in 
the global energy markets. This fear is exacerbated by the discussion among the 
major world powers of  a “China threat” to their respective energy supplies.
There has not been a single 
case of  deliberate disruption of  
China’s foreign energy supplies.
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There are a wide range of  views in China about how to address the risks of  
deliberate disruption to its energy supply. Regardless of  where one stands on 
this issue, it is essential to note that China’s dependence on maritime energy 
transportation is a natural state of  affairs that must be managed. The Taiwan 
Straits situation is perhaps by far the single greatest challenge to putting con-
cerns about maritime energy transportation security to rest. In the scenario 
of  war across the Taiwan Straits, there is no guarantee that the United States 
would not enlist the assistance of  its principal ally in northeast Asia (Japan) 
and other lesser allies (Singapore, the Philippines, and South Korea) to partici-
pate in another oil blockade against China. The comprehensive embargo the 
United States launched after the Korean War serves as a powerful reminder 
of  such a nightmarish scenario.12  Furthermore, expectations that Hong Kong 
may help offset the impact of  an oil blockage against China, as it did to some 
extent during the U.S.-led embargo from 1950 to 1971, will likely prove mis-
placed. Hong Kong may even be included in a future blockade, now that it has 
become a special administrative region of  China.
The Pipeline Option
Oil and gas pipelines from Russia and Central Asian states to China make 
good strategic sense given the frequent reappearance of  a competitive rela-
tionship between China on the one side and Japan and the United States on 
the other. In times of  peace (or at least no war), oil pipelined from Russia can 
be more economically transported to areas of  high-consumption regions – by 
population and industry – along China’s eastern coastline. In a similar vein, oil 
and gas pipelines from central Asia are useful not just for importing oil and 
gas, but also for cutting the transportation costs of  moving oil from the east 
to the west of  China.
During times of  war, ships carrying oil and gas would be vulnerable to 
naval interception, even within the distance between Dalian in the north and 
Guangzhou in the south. However, pipelines over land would certainly not 
be immune from aerial attack. Oil transportation routes, whether on land or 
at sea, would be justifiable military targets simply because a modern military 
relies on oil to move its armor and personnel to the front line.
An oil pipeline from Burma through southwestern China is another 
case in point.  This is passionately argued for on the strategic grounds that 
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it would reduce China’s vulnerability in relying on the critical geostrategic 
chokepoint, the Straits of  Malacca.13  However, the formidable geographical 
and geological challenges to maintaining such a pipeline beg the question of  
its economic viability. Transporting oil out of  the southwestern province of  
the Yunan-Guizhou plateau for consumption in eastern and southern parts 
of  China would not be a feasible market 
solution. Consideration of  oil pipelines 
should be constrained within the context 
of  economizing oil transportation inside 
China, and should not be elevated to a 
larger national energy security issue. 
Indeed, land-based oil pipelines are just 
a recent extension of  the larger debate in 
China over national strategic vulnerability. 
Similar questions were raised about the Three Gorges dam and the entire 
Chinese coast for constructing civilian-use nuclear power plants.14  While 
concern about exposure to foreign military attack was not the sole reason for 
the slow progress in building up China’s nuclear power industry, the concern 
today about China’s dependence on non-domestic sources of  oil should serve 
as another reminder against overly strategic thinking regarding options for 
energy security.
Instead, awareness about China’s geographical vulnerability should be 
turned into a powerful strategic motivation for cooperation with the powers 
that have the capacity to adversely affect China’s oil supply security. More 
specifically, China must pursue confidence-building measures with the major 
powers in the Pacific. It is important to note that since the 1970s, China 
has lived under the same cloud of  vulnerability as it does today. Pursuing 
land-based means of  transporting foreign oil and gas to China, for the sake 
of  minimizing the risk of  maritime attack or blockade, is not only against 
economic logic but also risks turning fear and the psychological element of  
energy insecurity into self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Untapped Potential of  Energy Prices
The setting of  energy prices goes to the heart of  China’s energy security. 
It is a highly complex issue, but of  critical importance is the basic tenet that a 
In war, ships carrying oil 
and gas would be vulnerable 
to naval interception and 
pipelines over land would not 
be immune from aerial attack.
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system of  energy pricing that accurately adapts to and reflects market funda-
mentals is essential to the pursuit of  sustainable development.
Raising energy prices is very unpopular in China, as it is elsewhere, mak-
ing this no simple task. Though still largely government-controlled, end-user 
price of  oil in China is quickly approaching the average level of  the United 
States. The Chinese media frequently complain about rises in oil and electric-
ity prices by referring to the per capita income gaps between Chinese and the 
major industrialized countries. Energy suppliers in China are often accused of  
being profit-hungry, in addition to monopolizing the domestic energy supply 
chain. 
That said, a further increase in oil prices in China is being, and should 
be, implemented, even if  the pace of  that adjustment is debatable. Keeping 
oil prices low to make room for further growth of  such ‘pillar’ industries as 
automobile manufacturing is not justifiable. Because automobiles are luxury 
items of  consumption, they should not be afforded preferential policies by 
the government. It is simply impossible for every Chinese to attain levels of  
private vehicle ownership available to the majority of  developed countries. 
The construction of  sufficient parking space alone is a formidable, perhaps 
impossible, challenge. This is to say nothing of  the pressing problems of  re-
source scarcity and environmental degradation. The government should focus 
on providing affordable and widely accessible means of  public transportation 
– an issue that major cities in China have only recently begun to address. 
The Chinese government has opted to impose stricter fuel emission 
standards for new automobiles sold in the Chinese market against increasing 
taxes on oil. This does entail additional costs on international automobile 
manufacturers operating domestically if  they choose to remain in the Chinese 
market.15 In this way, higher fuel efficiency in cars takes precedence over 
reducing the number of  drivers taking to the road. Nonetheless, it is certainly 
in China’s own interest and the rest of  the world to turn China’s automobile 
industry into a leader in producing fuel efficient vehicles.
The reform of  energy pricing and its various permutations in China’s 
socio-economic system opens yet another door for meaningful bilateral and 
multilateral dialogue on mechanisms to enhance China’s energy security. 
Strategic factors do play a role in thinking about supply interruptions, but it 
is unwise for China to overreact and implement ideas that run against basic 
economic logic. 
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Interdependence or Zero-Sum Competition
There has emerged a pattern in official positioning between the Chinese 
government and concerned international parties regarding China as a factor 
in the international energy scene. Chinese officials like to remind their inter-
national audience that China is heavily reliant on domestic resources to meet 
its energy needs, while the latter seek to understand what China is doing and 
plans to do to address global concerns about the disconcerting energy issues.
Despite this seeming disjuncture in perspectives of  China’s energy secu-
rity and its affect on global markets, the nature of  China’s relationship with 
the rest of  the world can best be characterized as one of  interdependence. 
The now common statement, “China needs the world, and the world needs 
China,” is truer today than ever before. Establishing bilateral and multilateral 
negotiation and cooperation mechanisms help to both routinize constructive 
interaction as well as recognize the cost of  non-cooperation.  This is not a 
guarantee for success but it greatly lowers the possibility of  vicious competi-
tion and military conflict. Oil diplomacy is simply not a zero-sum game. In 
the energy industry, all players, including the U.S. government, American and 
multinational oil companies, the Gulf  oil exporters, Europe, Japan and China 
can benefit from cooperation. The clear-eyed recognition of  interdependence 
as a crucial element in the complicated international political and economic 
interaction should provide a powerful inspiration when considering China’s 
oil supply security.
It is also important to keep in mind that historically the United States has 
been a force that has expended significant effort to uphold the economic 
rules of  the market operations worldwide. The United States will not likely 
shy away from using oil to influence or even intimidate other countries’ for-
eign and domestic policy, but will do so 
mainly with the one strategic goal in mind: 
making sure oil, especially Middle Eastern 
oil, flows to the United States and other 
major oil consumers around the world at 
an affordable price. Major oil importers shouldn’t be overly threatened by 
the reality of  America’s dominant influence over the production and supply 
of  the world oil market because suppliers and consumers of  oil do not fun-
damentally have a confrontational relationship but one where each is deeply 
dependent on the other.
Interdependence is certainly 
not devoid of  ambiguity.
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This is especially true of  China, whose overall economic development has 
resulted in a growing reliance on overseas oil and gas resources. At the same 
time, China’s import of  energy resources has reciprocally propelled both the 
growth of  the world’s oil and gas industry and global economy as a whole. 
China’s increase of  oil imports shouldn’t be treated as a problem, but rather 
as a normal phenomenon and part of  its growing interdependency with the 
rest of  the world. The fact is that China has benefited as much from the rest 
of  the world as the latter has from China.  
However, such interdependence is certainly not devoid of  ambiguity. It 
has developed in ways that are more complicated than in the past. For in-
stance, many have observed that China is currently going through what Japan 
experienced in the early 1970s.16  Japan’s rapid industrialization of  that time 
contributed to a ‘crowding out’ of  the global energy market leading to a host 
of  contentious issues that required a globally concerted effort to manage and 
negotiate smoothly. Crucially different than Japan, however, China is presently 
still not a ‘like-minded’ entity in the international structure that governs the 
world economy. For historical and political reasons, both real and imagined, 
China is seen as challenging the international order that has dominated the 
world for decades. 
Following the end of  the Cold War, the United States has established firm 
control over the Gulf  region militarily through two wars with Iraq. Americans 
have also directly interfered with China’s forays into the regional oil and 
gas markets in the Gulf.17  A conflict has arisen over the sales of  dual-use 
technologies and equipment. From the U.S. perspective, China’s military co-
operation and trade of  dual-use items with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
amounts to a weapons-for-oil strategy. This 
engenders a zero-sum struggle between 
China and the United States on these is-
sues.18  From China’s perspective, although 
it did not openly oppose the United States 
from using force against Iraq with a veto at 
the United Nations before the second Iraq 
war, the challenges China is facing in the Gulf  region haven’t diminished at all. 
In order to ensure access to a Middle Eastern supply of  oil, China finds itself  
in the uncomfortable position of  having to cater to the political demands of  
some of  its suppliers there.19  The result is an inevitable clash with the United 
Americans have also directly 
interfered with China’s forays 
into the regional oil and gas 
markets in the Gulf.
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States. For instance, in December 2003, the American Embassy in Beijing 
pressured CNPC into retracting its bid for the exploration of  16 new oil 
fields in Iran. Because other countries in the Middle East are more hostile to 
international investments in the upstream, China found it difficult to comply 
with U.S. demands.20  The current “China Threat Theory” popular in the 
United States has extended to beyond just the Asia-Pacific region and into the 
Gulf  region as well. 
Managing Interdependence
To best protect China’s oil and economic interests, it must work hard with 
the Gulf  exporters to establish a long-term mutual-dependence of  down-
stream and upstream industries. The core of  this relationship is for China to 
purchase the region’s petroleum while vigorously encouraging Gulf  exporters 
to acquire shares of  the growing Asian energy market with their own invest-
ment in refining. The Gulf  region is also becoming more and more important 
as a destination for investment by China’s own energy industry, as it actively 
seeks business opportunities overseas under the ‘go out strategy’. The oil 
economy is the key to linking the growing trade between the two regions. 
Additionally, the Gulf  region is both a potential market for Chinese com-
modities and an entry point for export further to the greater Middle Eastern 
region and East Africa. Despite the resistance from the United States and 
other countries, a firm platform of  common interests will emerge between 
the energy-oriented Gulf  countries pursuing economic diversification and a 
China that strives to maintain its strong economic growth.
Behind China’s mutually dependent relationship with the world’s energy 
suppliers is the hardboiled reality that China is the world’s third largest energy 
consumer and continues to grow at a rapid pace. This is not to condone 
China’s wielding of  its energy demand as a political bargaining chip when 
interacting with the rest of  the world. It does mean, however, that improving 
energy efficiency of  the Chinese economy is conducive not only to China’s 
core national interests but is also imperative to the rest of  the world – given 
the generally accepted truth about the limits in global availability of  fossil-
based energy supply and the dangers of  global warming.
On the other hand, China should not avoid, nor should it be expected to 
avert security issues relevant to the international sea lanes of  communication, 
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which China is intensely reliant on for transporting energy. Realists argue 
that China should accelerate naval build-up because its military self-defense 
capability lags far behind China’s energy interest and military warfare, espe-
cially military warfare on the sea, which is the final means for great powers 
to solve international trade disputes.21  Although these arguments may sound 
persuasive if  put in a broader strategic context, there are a number of  alterna-
tives for international sea transportation 
channels. Even with regard to the sea lane 
chokepoints, the advances in the tech-
nologies of  oil tankers and long-distance 
transportation makes it is possible to avoid 
bottlenecks, such as the Malacca Strait. 
Moreover, any action that involves naval 
power to protect oil tankers has to take 
into full consideration the consensus China 
must achieve with regional countries. However, opening the shipping lanes at 
the cost of  deterioration in diplomatic, military and strategic relations with 
China’s Southeast Asian neighbors begs the fundamental question whether 
the price is too high.
The sea lanes of  communication and the world oil markets are interna-
tional public goods. Participation in their maintenance and stability as well as 
helping shape the institutions and mechanisms that provide that service is an 
important part of  sustaining China’s oil security. As a responsible large nation, 
China has so far played a constructive role toward these goals. For instance, 
China has both contributed peacekeepers and provided development aid under 
the UN framework to further peace and stability in those regions. Also, China 
has adopted measures to address maritime piracy and anti-terrorism under the 
multiple consultation mechanism within the Association of  Southeast Asian 
Nations. These are largely regional issues pertinent to sea lane safety that 
not only serve China’s own interests but also contribute to the security of  
Southeast Asia’s sea lanes. Looking forward, China should continue to play an 
active role in combating piracy particularly when it involves criminal elements 
in China. Finding future steps to achieve the ways and means for China to 
fully participate in the policing of  the sea lanes with the major powers of  the 
world will be a crucial challenge in the years ahead.
China should build on the expertise and experience it has acquired through 
China’s interests in the Gulf  
region hold no fundamental 
contradiction to the economic 
relationship between China 
and the United States.
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interacting with the rest of  the world during the past three decades of  reform 
to enhance its capacity in dealing with the strategic difficulties. Confidence 
building with the major powers in the Pacific, particularly the United States 
and Japan, is the desired option to pursue. U.S. interference of  Chinese coop-
eration with Gulf  nations in the energy industry will likely endure for a long 
time. But, investment by Chinese companies under the ‘go out’ strategy and 
the simultaneous development of  Gulf  countries’ interests in the Chinese oil 
industry would be a natural and mutually beneficial economic relationship 
that provides a strong basis for healthy interdependence. At the same time, 
China’s interests in the Gulf  region hold no fundamental contradiction to 
the economic relationship between China and the United States. Therefore, 
the essence of  China’s task ahead is how it can participate in the multina-
tional cooperative mechanisms for international crude oil supply under U.S. 
dominance.
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